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Summary
Matching unfamiliar faces is highly error-prone, and most studies highlight the impli-
cations for real-world ID-checking. Here we study a particular instance of ID-check-
ing: proof of age for buying restricted goods such as alcohol. In this case, checkers
must establish that an identity document is carried by its legitimate owner (i.e., that
the ID photo matches the face of the bearer) and that the ID proves the bearer to be
old enough to make the purchase. Across three experiments, using two common
forms of photo-ID (i.e., driving licenses, PASS+ cards) we show that observers pro-
duce very high error rates when age requirements are met, but faces mismatch. This
bias away from detecting a face mismatch remained evident in experienced
cashiers—though to a somewhat attenuated level. We discuss interactions between
face matching and other tasks, and the practical consequences of a bias which
favours those using photo-ID with fraudulent intent.
K E YWORD S
age verification, expertise, face recognition, identity cards, identity fraud
1 | INTRODUCTION
It is now well-established that matching pictures of unfamiliar faces is
a challenging task and one which is highly prone to error (Bobak,
Dowsett, & Bate, 2016; Bruce et al., 1999; Burton, White, &
McNeill, 2010; Fysh & Bindemann, 2018; Johnston & Edmonds, 2009;
Robertson, Black, Chamberlain, Megreya, & Davis, 2020; Stacchi,
Huguenin-Elie, Caldara, & Ramon, 2020). This difficulty is particularly
evident when viewers are asked to match individuals to their photo-
ID (Kemp, Towell, & Pike, 1997; McCaffery & Burton, 2016; Meissner,
Susa, & Ross, 2013; Papesh, 2018; Wirth & Carbon, 2017). Face
matching is an important part of daily ID tasks, for example the pur-
chase of age-restricted goods like alcohol and tobacco. However, the
large majority of research on identification decisions focuses on the
face match itself, not on other important biographical information pre-
sent in ID documents. In the current study we examine age-
verification from ID in a mock supermarket setting. Customers' ID
must show a face that matches the bearer, and an age above the legal
minimum for alcohol sales. We examine how these two task compo-
nents combine and interact.
Our ability to recognize, or accurately match, new instances of
people we are familiar with is an almost effortless and highly accurate
process, even in cases in which there is considerable within person-
variability across images (Jenkins, White, Van Montfort, &
Burton, 2011). In contrast, when the individuals are unfamiliar to the
observer, recognising or matching new instances of unfamiliar people
is a challenging task and one in which error rates of 20% are common
(Burton et al., 2010). Similarly high error rates are reported regardless
of whether viewers are required to make a match/mismatch distinc-
tion between pairs of unfamiliar face photos (Megreya &
Burton, 2006), or between a face photo and the live face of a person
standing in front of them (Davis & Valentine, 2009; Megreya &
Burton, 2008), as would be the case in real world contexts. Further-
more, substantial errors are also reported from those whose
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occupations involve face matching, such as police, passport officers or
supermarket check-out staff (Burton, Wilson, Cowan, & Bruce, 1999;
Kemp et al., 1997; White, Kemp, Jenkins, Matheson, & Burton, 2014).
While our reliance on face photo ID for identity verification is not
supported by psychological evidence, such documents remain the
most widely used means of identity checking. Several studies have
directly assessed unfamiliar face matching performance with face
photos embedded in identity documents. Studies by Meissner
et al. (2013) and Bindemann and Sandford (2011) have reported
20–30% errors when viewers were asked to match face photos
embedded in mock American passports, or in student ID cards, to a
second face photo. In addition, Kemp et al. (1997) reported large rates
of error when asking supermarket cashiers to match face photos
embedded in mock credit cards to the faces of customers live. While
these studies further highlight the difficulties that unfamiliar face
matching poses in applied contexts, they focused only on face
matching. That is, the studies did not include experimental manipula-
tions of the other biographical details on the identity document, such
as the date or birth, which cashiers would use to verify the individual's
age, or the biographical details, checked at passport control.
A recent study by McCaffery and Burton (2016) did directly investi-
gate the interaction between unfamiliar face matching performance and
the active assessment of related biographical information in a passport
checking context. This study presented pairs of unfamiliar faces in isola-
tion or with one of the faces embedded in a UK passport frame. Partici-
pants were asked to make match/mismatch decisions to the face pairs,
but also to evaluate the biographical information when one of the faces
appeared within a passport. Such data was sometimes implausible, for
example noting the wrong sex for a person, or giving a date of birth
which was highly implausible. Across three experiments, McCaffery and
Burton (2016) reported that simply embedding a face in a passport frame
consistently biased picture-matching responses towards “match,” that is,
participants missed more “fraudulent” mismatch face pairs. Moreover,
faces influenced data checking: when faces matched, participants were
less likely to detect biographical errors. Further examination of face
matching in real documents shows that the biasing effects of a passport
context are also present in other documents such as driving licenses and
student ID (Feng & Burton, 2019).
These findings show that different sources of information in an iden-
tity document are not processed independently. This is important,
because many uses of ID involve both face and biographical checks. For
example, supermarket cashiers selling age-restricted goods need both to
check identity and calculate age. Therefore, in this study we assess
whether there are interactions between age and identity verification in a
card-checking task. In our experimental context, participants take the role
of a cashier who should ensure that only customers who are aged 18+
and who present a genuine ID document are sold alcohol (Experiment 1).
We also assess identity checking accuracy (i.e., face matching perfor-
mance) in this context using ID cards which explicitly represent age,
rather than requiring an age calculation (Experiment 2). Finally, we com-
pare the performance of student volunteers and individuals who currently
work as supermarket cashiers on these tasks (Experiment 3). Across the
three experiments, our focus is on error rates in our “critical condition,”
which relates to ID checks in which an age appropriate card is presented
but there is a mismatch between the face of the customer and the face
photo on the identity card. This condition best mirrors ID fraud attacks in
this context, in which minors are using someone else's identity card in
order to try and obtain alcohol or other age restricted goods.
2 | EXPERIMENT 1
In this experiment, participants are asked to take on the role of a
cashier working at a supermarket checkout. They are informed that
each of their customers would like to purchase alcohol, that the legal
age for doing so is 18, and that in order to make the correct decision
they must check the individual's ID card to verify their age and iden-
tity. Here we use mock-ups of UK provisional driving licenses as the
identity cards, as they can be obtained by individuals as young as
15 years 9 months, and are a widely-accepted form of ID. These ID
cards display dates of birth, which we manipulated here to denote
ages between 16 and 26 at the time of the study. Within the experi-
ment, the participants would encounter customers whose faces mat-
ched or did not match the photo-ID, and ID cards showing the bearer
to be old enough or too young to buy alcohol. A common real-world
fraud is mimicked by the condition in which an ID denotes legal age
but the face mismatches. A minor could obtain alcohol by presenting
another person's ID card showing an individual who looks somewhat
like them, and which verifies that they are old enough to buy alcohol.
2.1 | Method
2.1.1 | Ethics statement
Each experiment reported in this paper was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of York,
UK. All participants provided written informed consent, had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and each received a course credit or mon-
etary payment for their participation.
2.1.2 | Participants
Thirty-six participants (30 female) with a mean age of 21 years (SD = 3,
Range = 18–31) were recruited from the University of York Department
of Psychology. None of the participants currently worked full-time or
part-time in an occupation that required photo-ID identity checks.
2.1.3 | Stimuli and apparatus
One hundred and forty-four pairs of faces were selected from the
Glasgow Face Matching Test (GFMT; Burton et al., 2010), half of the
pairs showed two photos of the same person (face match trials) and
the remaining half showed two different photos of similar looking
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people (face mismatch trials). Faces in the GFMT show young people
who were students at the time of photography. Two images were cre-
ated for each of the faces in the set. The first image was a large (7 cm
× 9 cm) full color photo, which provided the images of the “customer.”
The second image was a smaller black and white photo which was
embedded in a mock UK Provisional Driving License frame, using the
same dimensions as a real license (frame 8.5 cm × 5.5 cm; photo
3.5 cm × 4.5 cm). As seen in Figure 1, the driving licenses used in the
experiment closely matched their real-world counterparts. On each
trial, the customer's face photo and their identity card were displayed
within a supermarket cashier context, with an image showing shelves
of alcohol in the background, and the checkout setup in the fore-
ground. The experiment was presented on a 12-in. Hewlett Packard
laptop using E-Prime 2.0.
2.1.4 | Procedure
The experiment began by outlining the context of the task. Partici-
pants were told that they would take on the role of a supermarket
cashier working at the checkout. The participants were told that each
of the customers they would face would be trying to buy alcohol, and
on each occasion (i.e., trial), the customer would present the cashier
with an ID card which included a face photo and a date of birth. Par-
ticipants were reminded that the sale of alcohol to anyone under the
age of 18 was illegal, and that they should only agree to the sale if the
ID card verified the customer's identity (i.e., the face photo on the
card matched the customer's face) and their age (i.e., their date of
birth made them aged 18 or above). Participants were made aware of
the location of the face photo and the date of birth in an example
driving license presented at the start of the task.
Trials were self-paced, and participants made a keyboard button-
press to indicate whether they would, or would not, sell alcohol in this
case. Across the task, participants encountered all combinations of face
(match/mismatch) and age (old enough/too young). Each testing ses-
sion consisted of 144 trials, with 36 trials per experimental condition.
For the 72 trials in which the ID card showed the owner to be too
young, a date of birth was randomly selected which indicated that the
bearer was 16 or 17. For the remaining 72, dates of birth in the age
range of 18–26 years were randomly selected. Trial order was random-
ized within participants, while face image was counterbalanced across
participants such that both identities within a face pair were shown
both as the “customer's” face and as the face photo on the identity
card. In addition, the irrelevant information that appeared on the ID
card also varied trial to trial, with name, driver number, city, address,
post code, date of issue and date of expiry all being randomly selected
in order to make the context as realistic as possible.
Across the three experiments reported in this paper, participants
were also asked to record their ID checking strategy on completion of the
behavioral task. The response options were “I checked the face first
followed by the date of birth,” or “I checked the date of birth first
followed by the face.” A single analysis is performed on this data across
the three experiments and is reported at the end of the results section for
Experiment 3. A typical testing session lasted approximately 45 min.
2.2 | Results and discussion
2.2.1 | Response errors (%)
Figure 2 shows participants' mean response errors across condition.
These were entered into a 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the
F IGURE 1 An example of a “critical condition” trial from Experiment 1 in which the “customer” has presented an age appropriate driving
license, but in which there is mismatch between the face of the bearer and the face photo on the ID card (i.e., a fraud attack)
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factors of matching condition (face match, face mismatch) and age
denoted on card (under 18, over 18). The ANOVA revealed main
effects of both the matching, F(1, 35) = 54.51, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.61,
and the age conditions, F(1, 35) = 74.95, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.68, which
were qualified by a matching × age interaction, F(1, 35) = 177.63,
p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.84. Tests of simple main effects showed that for the
under 18 cards, response errors in the face match condition were sig-
nificantly higher than in the face mismatch condition, F(1, 35) = 9.94,
p = .003, ηp
2 = 0.21. In contrast, an opposite and much larger effect
was observed for over 18 cards, in which response errors in the face
mismatch condition were significantly higher, by a margin of 46% on
average, compared to the face match condition, F(1, 35) = 105.04,
p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.75.
The most striking effect here is that participants shown a legal-
age driving license, are highly prone to making an error when the
faces mismatch. The decision to sell alcohol seems to be heavily
biased towards use of the age data, and not evidence from face
matching—a conclusion also consistent with the generally low error
rate for under-18 cards. In short, use of a fraudulent ID card, showing
someone of legal age, is hard for our participants to detect.
2.2.2 | Response times (RTs)
A second ANOVA on participants' mean correct response times (RTs)
revealed a main effect of age, F(1, 35) = 11.30, p = .002, ηp
2 = 0.24, but
not matching condition, F(1, 35) = 2.99, p = .093, ηp
2 = 0.79, which was
qualified by an age × matching condition interaction, F(1, 35) = 13.46,
p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.28. Follow up tests of simple main effects revealed the
same pattern as reported for response errors above, with significantly
longer RTs for under 18 card condition when there was a face match
(M = 3.0s), compared to a face mismatch (M = 3.4s), F(1, 35) = 6.43,
p = .016, ηp
2 = 0.16. In contrast, for the over 18 card condition, RTs were
significantly longer in the presence of a face mismatch (M = 4.6s), com-
pared to a face match (M = 3.0s), F(1, 35) = 8.25, p = .007, ηp
2 = 0.19.
3 | EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 1, we used a typical UK identity card, the provisional
driving license, and the results showed that the relatively simple pro-
cess of an age calculation appears to bias subsequent identity verifica-
tion decisions, leading to more acceptances of faces that do not
match. This is a problem for security, as it suggests that people with
fraudulent intent could benefit from use of a card showing legitimate
age, even if the face is not a good match. One reason for the poor per-
formance reported in Experiment 1 could be the level of cognitive
load imposed on checkers as a result of having to perform a numerical
calculation and a demanding unfamiliar face matching task. Limited
capacity processing has been shown across a wide variety of tasks
(Lavie, 1995; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004), and it could be
the case that working memory capacity limits are the underlying cause
for such poor decision making (Anderson, Reder, & Lebiere, 1996;
Baddeley, 1992). Therefore, in Experiment 2 we seek to assess
whether the removal of the age calculation, and the associated reduc-
tion in cognitive load imposed by the checking process, could amelio-
rate this effect.
To that end, in Experiment 2, we test ID cards which explicitly
state that the bearer is of legal age, rather than requiring an age calcula-
tion from d.o.b. PASS+ is a “Proof of Age Standards Scheme” set up in
the United Kingdom in 2014 (http://www.pass-scheme.org.uk/). Iden-
tity cards are issued to individuals who have proved during a rigorous
application process that they are indeed aged 18 or above. This applica-
tion process involves, among other verification steps, the submission of
official documents (e.g., birth certificate, passport, NHS card, CRB
check) countersigned by an appropriate referee (see https://www.
citizencard.com/requirements-for-a-first-uk-id-card). The cards bear
the owner's photograph (similar to a driving license) and confirm that
the owner is over 18 (see Figure 3). So, people checking legal age for
purchase of restricted goods need only ensure that the photo matches
the bearer. In Experiment 2 we examine identity checking errors in the
same sale of alcohol context used in Experiment 1, comparing ID cards
which require an age calculation (UK Provisional Driving License) and
those which do not (PASS+ Cards).
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants
Thirty-six participants (29 female) with a mean age of 20 years (SD = 3,
Range = 17–32) were recruited from the University of York Department
of Psychology. None of the participants currently worked full-time or
part-time in an occupation that required photo-ID identity checks.
3.1.2 | Stimuli, apparatus and procedure
The stimuli, apparatus and procedure were identical to those
described for Experiment 1, with the exception that half of the
F IGURE 2 Graph showing the mean percentage response error
rates found in Experiment 1, as a function of checking condition. Error
bars show within-subjects SE (Cousineau, 2005)
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customers (72 trials, 36 Face Match, 36 Face Mismatch) now showed
a PASS+ identity card. Therefore, the initial instructions were
amended to inform the participants that both age and identity had to
be verified when the customer presented a provisional driving license,
but only identity had to be verified if the customer presented an 18+
PASS card.
3.2 | Results and discussion
3.2.1 | Response errors (%)
Figure 4 shows participants' mean response errors across condition.
The driving license condition provided a direct replication of our
F IGURE 3 An example of a PASS card “critical condition” trial from Experiment 2, no age calculation is required, and the faces mismatch. The
“Face Check Only” message appeared on all trials in this condition to re-inforce the pre-task instruction that only a face identity check was
required for PASS identity cards
F IGURE 4 Graph showing the mean percentage response error rates found in Experiment 2, as a function of checking condition. Error bars
show within-subjects SE (Cousineau, 2005)
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design from Experiment 1, so here we test that replication using a
2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA on mean response errors, with the
factors of face matching condition (match, mismatch) and age on card
(under 18, over 18). The ANOVA revealed main effects of both the
matching, F(1, 35) = 50.76, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.59, and age conditions, F
(1, 35) = 103.70, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.75, which were qualified by a
matching × age interaction, F(1, 35) = 75.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.68. Fol-
low up tests of simple main effects showed an identical pattern of
findings to that reported in Experiment 1. For the under 18 cards,
response errors in the face match condition were significantly higher
than in the face mismatch condition, F(1, 35) = 13.87, p = .001,
ηp
2 = 0.28. In contrast, an opposite and much larger effect was
observed for over 18 cards, in which response errors in the face mis-
match condition were significantly higher, by a margin of 38% (7% vs.
45%) on average in this Experiment, compared to the face match con-
dition, F(1, 35) = 69.84, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.67. Note that the typical
GFMT mismatch condition error rate is approximately 10%.
Following the replication of our results from Experiment 1, we
next examined performance on the PASS+ card, which confirms legiti-
mate age for alcohol purchase. As can be seen in Figure 4, the PASS+
card gives very similar results to that of the legitimate-age Driving
License: error rates were significantly higher in the face mismatch
condition compared to the face match condition, t(35) = 9.63,
p < .001, d = 1.67. That is, the use of the PASS+ card did not eliminate
the age verification bias. As seen in Figure 4, for both match, t
(35) = 5.28, p < .001, d = 0.88, and mismatch conditions, t(35) = 2.42,
p = .021, d = 0.40, error rates were significantly lower for PASS+ cards
compared to driving licenses. However, these reductions were small
in size, with only a 7% reduction for PASS+ cards compared to driving
licenses in the critical condition (18+, faces mismatch). That is, when
the requirement to make an age calculation is removed, and the cogni-
tive load of the task is reduced, there is a 7% reduction in the likeli-
hood that a cashier would accept an ID card in which the face photo
does not match the customer's face. However, the reduction in error
is modest in size, and 38% errors in the critical condition in the PASS+
card still represents a threefold increase in error compared to the typi-
cal rates generated by the regular GFMT (i.e., face matching with no
“ID card” context). This may suggest, that the mere presence of a face
in an official identity document used to explicitly verify the bearer's
age, could be enough to significantly bias decisions in favor of fraudu-
lent use (see McCaffery & Burton, 2016).
3.2.2 | Response times (RTs)
A second 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA on mean correct response
times for the driving license conditions revealed no main effects and
no interaction (all F's < 1). RTs across the conditions were relatively
consistent: for the under 18 cards, mean correct RTs were 4.5s in the
match condition and 4.2 s in the mismatch condition. For over
18 cards, mean correct RTs were 4.4s in the match condition and 4.6s
in the mismatch condition. While there were no significant effects on
RTs in Experiment 2, the data does trend in the same direction as
reported in Experiment 1. In addition, RTs across these conditions
were at least a full second longer than those reported for the equiva-
lent conditions in Experiment 1. It could be the case that due to the
inclusion of additional face matching content in the instructions of the
present experiment, that greater attention was paid to the matching
element of the task. Despite this, mean response error rates do not
differ substantially between Experiment 1 and Experiment
2, suggesting that it is an age verification bias rather than a speed/
accuracy trade-off that is driving the effect on error rates.
As with the response error analysis, the important comparisons
here were within the PASS+ card conditions (match, mismatch), and
between the critical conditions (18+, mismatch) across card type.
Paired t tests revealed that, for the PASS+ card, correct RTs were sig-
nificantly longer in the face mismatch condition (M = 4.7s), compared
to the face match condition (M = 3.3s), supporting the findings from
Experiment 1, for driving licenses, in which an over 18 card with
mismatching faces required the greatest deliberation time and cogni-
tive effort. As with the error rate findings, eliminating the age calcula-
tion through the use of the PASS+ card, did not eliminate this effect.
Across card types, correct RTs were found to be significantly faster in
the PASS+ card match condition (M = 3.3s), compared to the driving
license match condition (M = 4.4s), t(35) = 3.68, p = .001, d = 0.62.
Taken together with the error rate analysis, this shows that using an
PASS+ card leads observers to make the correct decision more quickly
and more often when the bearer's face is a match to the face on the
card. However, somewhat surprisingly, there was no difference in cor-
rect RTs between the PASS+ card mismatch condition (M = 4.7s) and
the 18+ mismatch driving license condition (M = 4.6s), t < 1. This sug-
gests that the age confirmation bias remains, in relation to RTs,
regardless of whether an active calculation is required or not.
4 | EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 2 replicated our original study in showing that legal-
purchase checks are severely compromised when ID shows legitimate
age. In both Experiments 1 and 2, people are highly likely to accept ID
as genuine, even with a mismatching face, as long as the bearer's age
is legitimate. Experiment 2 shows that this effect is not due simply to
ID-checker's having to calculate an age from a d.o.b. Even when age-
legitimacy is given in the PASS+ card, leaving a requirement only to
compare faces, participants make very high numbers of errors. Note
that the face pairs used here come from a standardized face test, the
Glasgow Face Matching Test. Errors on this test, when showing face
pairs in isolation (i.e., without ID cards or backgrounds) are typically in
the range of 10–18% (Burton et al., 2010; Fysh & Bindemann, 2018;
McCaffery, Robertson, Young, & Burton, 2018; Robertson
et al., 2020; Verhallen et al., 2017). So, in these experiments' errors
are much higher, even in conditions where context is essentially task-
irrelevant, because viewers have only to match faces.
While these experiments suggest that photo-ID does not guaran-
tee compliance with age-restricted purchases, we do not yet know
whether this would be a problem for experienced check-out staff.
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Several studies have shown that occupational experience does not
appear to be associated with identity verification performance, with
police officers (Burton et al., 1999; Wirth & Carbon, 2017), and pass-
port officers (White, Kemp, et al., 2014) performing no better than
untrained student controls. Further, Kemp et al. (1997) showed high
levels of face matching error, without an age calculation, in supermar-
ket cashiers asked to verify face-photo credit cards. However, we
need to establish whether experience is a key issue for the specific
task under study here—checking age-appropriate purchases using
standard photo-ID. In the following experiment, we recruited experi-
enced supermarket check-out staff. We also returned to the use of
driving license-ID only, as this is by far the most common form of ID-
verification at purchase points.
4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants
Eighteen student cashiers (14 Female) with a mean age of 20 years
(SD = 1, Range = 19–24) were recruited from a University of York
research advertising service. From this sample, all cashiers were cur-
rently active in part-time jobs requiring age and identity verification to
ensure that alcohol was not sold to minors. In terms of occupation,
11 cashiers reported working in a supermarket/shop, and 7 in a bar/-
pub. The mean number of months in which the cashiers had been
employed in these roles was 15 (SD = 12), 2 cashiers had only been in
post for 1 month but confirmed that during that period they had
requested ID from a customer on at least one occasion. A further
18 participants (16 Female) with a mean age of 19 years (SD = 1,
Range = 18–20) were recruited from the University of York partici-
pant pool, these individuals had no prior experience in any role that
required identity checking. Our sample was well matched for sex, and
while the cashier group was statistically older than the control group,
t(34) = 2.73, p = .010, d = 0.94; numerically, this was a modest differ-
ence of 1 year on average.
4.1.2 | Stimuli, apparatus and procedure
The stimuli, apparatus and procedure were identical to those reported
in Experiment 1, with the exception that the cashier group provided
additional information on the type of ID checking role in which they
worked, and the amount of time they had spent doing so.
4.2 | Results and discussion
4.2.1 | Response errors (%)
Figure 5 shows participants' mean response errors across condition.
Data were entered into a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design ANOVA with the
within subjects factors of matching condition (face match, face mis-
match) and age on card (over 18, under 18), and the between subjects
factor of group (cashiers, controls). The ANOVA revealed that each of
the main effects and two-way interactions were significant, full statis-
tics for these effects are included in the supplementary mate-
rials (Appendix S1). These effects were qualified by an matching × age
× group interaction, F(1, 34) = 6.07, p = .019, ηp
2 = 0.15. As a result of
this three-way interaction, and for clarity in our reporting of the results,
we will split the data by group and perform two 2 × 2 repeated mea-
sures ANOVAs with the factors of matching condition (face match, face
mismatch) and age denoted on card (under 18, over 18).
For the control group, the ANOVA revealed main effects of both
the matching, F(1, 17) = 56.59, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.77, and the age condi-
tions, F(1, 17) = 72.69, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.81, which were qualified by a
matching × age interaction, F(1, 17) = 97.29, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.85. As
seen in Figure 5, tests of simple main effects showed that for the
F IGURE 5 Graph showing the mean percentage response error rates found in Experiment 3. Error bars show within-subjects SE
(Cousineau, 2005)
ROBERTSON AND BURTON 7
under 18 cards, there was a trend towards response errors in the face
match condition being higher than in the face mismatch condition, F
(1, 17) = 3.14, p = .094, ηp
2 = 0.16. In contrast, an opposite, larger, and
significant effect was observed for over 18 cards, in which response
errors in the face mismatch condition were significantly higher, by a
margin of 51% on average, compared to the face match condition, F(1,
17) = 75.59, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.82. These results from the control
group, replicate our findings for over 18 driving license cards reported
in Experiment's 1 and 2. The non-significant difference between
match and mismatch for under 18 cards in this Experiment is likely to
be due to the reduced sample size (N = 18) in comparison to Experi-
ment's 1 and 2 (both N = 36).
For the cashier group, the ANOVA revealed main effects of both
the matching, F(1, 17) = 14.84, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.77, and the age condi-
tions, F(1, 17) = 15.64, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.48, which were qualified by a
matching × age interaction, F(1, 17) = 39.03, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.70. As
seen in Figure 5, and in line with the effects reported for the control
group, tests of simple main effects showed that for the under 18 cards,
there was a non-significant trend, F < 1, towards response errors in
the face match condition being higher than in the face mismatch con-
dition. In contrast, an opposite, larger, and significant effect was
observed for over 18 cards, in which response errors in the face mis-
match condition were significantly higher, by a margin of 30% on
average, compared to the face match condition, F(1, 17) = 45.01,
p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.73. These results show that the same bias found in
the control group and in the untrained samples recruited for Experi-
ment's 1 and 2 were still present in the cashier group. That is, experi-
enced and trained cashiers who are employed in roles which require
age and identity checks were subject to the same effects found in an
untrained sample of university students.
Having established that the same bias exists in both cashiers and
controls, it is important to assess whether the reduced cashier error
rates represent a significant effect. A series of independent t tests
showed that while there were no differences between the groups for
match and mismatch error rates in the under 18 card condition, t's < 1,
and no difference between groups in the match condition for over
18 cards, t < 1, there was a significant difference in performance
between cashiers and controls in the critical over 18 card mismatch
condition, t(34) = 3.06, p = .004, d = 1.02, with the mean cashiers error
rate being 21% lower than the control group, as seen in Figure 5. That
is, in a fraud situation in which a customer has presented a driving
license to a cashier with a face photo of another person, with a d.o.b
which would make them over 18, cashiers would wrongly sell them
alcohol 34% of the time compared to 55% in controls. Although there
is a cashier advantage here, error rates of 34% in this context are still
unacceptable high, and these mismatch error rates are much higher
than one would expect if the faces were presented in isolation.
4.2.2 | Response times (RTs)
A second 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design ANOVA on participants mean cor-
rect response times (RTs) revealed no main effect of group, F < 1, no
interaction between group and face matching or age on card, both
F's < 1, and no three-way interaction between group, face matching
and age, F(1, 34) = 1.16, p = .289, ηp
2 = 0.03. However, there was a
main effect of age on card, F(1, 34) = 19.93, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.37, and
face matching condition, F(1, 34) = 15.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.31, which
were qualified by an age × matching condition interaction, F(1,
34) = 17.71, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.34. Follow up tests of simple main
effects revealed the same pattern as reported for response errors
above, with no significant difference in RTs for the under 18 card con-
dition when there was a face match (M = 3.5s), compared to a face
mismatch (M = 3.4s), F < 1. In contrast, for the over 18 card condition,
RTs were significantly longer in the presence of a face mismatch
(M = 5.3s), compared to a face match (M = 3.5s), F(1, 35) = 21.6,
p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.38.
4.2.3 | Cashier experience
A Pearson's correlation analysis on the number of months cashiers
had spent in an ID checking role and their critical condition error rates
revealed a non-significant positive association, r(18) = 0.412, p = .089.
There is no hint here of an expertise effect in which more experienced
cashiers perform better—with the (nonsignificant) trend going in the
opposite direction.
This study shows reduced error rates by experienced cashiers
(as compared to inexperienced students) in the critical “correct-age/
wrong photo” condition. However, the cashiers' error rates remain
very high. Once again, we note that face matching with these stimuli
(the GFMT) typically give rise to error rates well below 20%, but that
embedding the decision within an age-check purchase context gives
rise to much higher rates—even for those experienced with the task.
4.2.4 | ID checking strategy
As noted above, across the three experiments, participants were
asked to record their ID checking strategy for the driving license ID
cards upon completion of the checking task. The response options
open to participants were “I checked the face first followed by the
date of birth,” or “I checked the date of birth first followed by the
face.” Here we collapse strategy responses from participants across
the three experiments and assess whether checking strategy prefer-
ence affects critical condition error rates. Across the sample (N = 108),
75 participants (69%) reported adopting an age-then-face ID checking
strategy, with the remaining 33 participants (31%) opting to check the
face first followed by the age. There was no difference in the number
of participants who adopted either strategy between the cashier and
control groups in Experiment 3.
An independent-samples t-test revealed that significantly fewer
critical condition errors were made by those participants who adopted
a Face-Age checking strategy (M = 26%, SD = 18%, Range = 0–66%),
compared to an Age-Face checking strategy (M = 52%, SD = 22%,
Range = 6–100%), t(106) = 6.08, p < .001, d = 1.29. While it is the
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case that the checking strategy groups have unequal sample sizes, this
finding provides preliminary evidence for the view that the adoption
of a face first ID checking strategy, may be advantageous in reducing
the likelihood that a cashier would accept a mismatching, but age
appropriate, identity card.
5 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
This was the first study, to our knowledge, to assess interactions
between age and identity verification in a retail context, using novice
undergraduate students and experienced cashiers. Across three
experiments we show that successfully verifying age, on the basis of
standard personal-ID, significantly biased observer judgements away
from spotting face mismatches. Here, we show that, for untrained
observers, 51% (Experiment 1), 45% (Experiment 2) and 45%
(Experiment 3) of the time that a participant was asked to detect a
“fraud” (i.e., critical condition 18+/face mismatch trials), they made
the wrong decision, leading to the illegal sale of alcohol. Typical error
rates with these facial stimuli range between 11% and 18%,
depending on which subset is used (Burton et al., 2010). So, these
error rates are much higher than one would expect based on perfor-
mance with the faces in isolation.
This finding is line with the results reported by McCaffery and
Burton (2016). They reported, in a passport checking context, that a
“same” face matching judgement resulted in the detection of fewer
errors in related biographical details. Similarly, here we show that an
accurate 18+ age verification calculation resulted in the detection of
significantly fewer mismatch face pairs. Across both studies, these
interactions between face matching and other related information
biases the final checking decision in an unsafe direction (i.e., favoring
users of fraudulent documents). Here we characterize this effect as an
age confirmation bias (Klayman, 1995; Mynatt, Doherty, &
Tweney, 1977; Nickerson, 1998), in which the cognitive resources
that have gone into accurately calculating an 18+ age from date of
birth information, creates a pre-existing framework (e.g., “this ID
check is likely to be fine”) which biases the face matching decision to
accept that the customers face matches the face photo, when in fact
they are two different people.
In Experiment 2, we found that eliminating the cognitive demands
of an age calculation, through the use of pre-verified PASS+ cards,
reduced, but did not eliminate critical condition errors, compared to
the driving license ID's. This finding showed that the age conforma-
tion bias appears to persist, even when the cognitive load imposed by
the checking task is significantly reduced. In other words, the pre-
existing age verification framework, this time imposed by the nature
of the PASS+ card and not via a cognitively demanding calculation,
remained potent enough to bias mismatch trial decision making
towards “match.” Moreover, the reduction in PASS+ card critical con-
dition errors was modest (7%), remaining much higher than one would
expect if this were only a face matching task, and much higher than
retailers, licensing authorities and policing would be likely to find
acceptable.
In Experiment 3, we assessed whether a group of cashiers who
were currently working in retail environments which required proof of
age checks, would perform any better than a control sample with no
such experience. While we found that the cashier group performed
better than the controls in the critical condition, making 21% fewer
incorrect decisions than controls, critical condition error rates
remained far from perfect (34%). While it is the case that several stud-
ies have shown that experience is not associated with enhanced iden-
tity verification performance (e.g., Burton et al., 1999; White et al,
2014), there are now a number of recent studies which, in line with
our current findings, do show that experienced identity checkers can
outperform naïve samples, but without showing a meaningful “step-
change” in error rates (i.e., they still remain far from perfect; Phillips,
Yates, Hu et al, 2018; Towler, White, & Kemp, 2017; White, Phillips,
Hahn, Hill, & O'Toole, 2015; White, Dunn, Schmid, & Kemp, 2015).
In Experiment 3, we also report an unexpected trend between
critical condition errors and cashier experience, which suggested that
greater experience led to greater critical condition errors. Further
experimentation will be needed to establish whether this relationship
is reliable, as the reported association is non-significant and statisti-
cally weak. However, if the effect turns out to be robust, it may be
that, given the time pressure cashiers are under, they focus on getting
the age calculation correct as quickly as they can, paying less attention
to the matching decision than their more inexperienced counterparts.
Our findings on checking strategy are consistent with this explanation
and the likelihood that an age confirmation bias drives our critical con-
dition effects. Across the three experiments, 69% of participants
reported checking the date of birth first (i.e., the age verification task
first) and then the face pairs, for the driving license ID cards. How-
ever, it was the opposite strategy, checking the face pairs first and
then performing the age calculation, that resulted in significantly
fewer errors in the critical condition. It is important to note that this
face-first strategy, while still not eliminating errors, provided a much
bigger improvement in performance (26%) than simply switching to
PASS cards (7%). Checking strategy was reported by participants after
completion of the task, however, it is not clear from the current
dataset whether they used this strategy on all trials. Therefore, future
work in which strategy is explicitly manipulated will be needed to
resolve any causal effects. Should they exist, there are clear benefits
for staff training in checking ID.
We also note that we did not introduce time and social pres-
sure into our design: most cashiers report being under pressure and
somewhat uncomfortable at having to ask a customer for ID. Nor
did we assess the effects of poor quality lighting on matching per-
formance (i.e., the type of environment an ID checker may be
placed in at a bar or nightclub; see Mileva & Hancock, 2019). In
addition, the proportion of critical condition trials (i.e., fraud
attacks) in our study may be larger than many cashiers would be
presented with in daily work. Papesh and Goldinger (2014) have
shown that reducing the frequency of face mismatches can lead to
greater error rates, and the present data could be underestimating
the likelihood of a fraud attack being successful. Finally, we note
that some of our GFMT-long form faces would have looked older
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than 18 even in conditions in which the date of birth displayed on the
card labelled them as underage for the purposes of buying alcohol. We
now aim to investigate these factors in a series of follow up studies
which will include a new set of face pairs from individuals in the 16–25
age range only, which will allow us to test the strength of this age con-
firmation bias with a fully age appropriate face set.
As an additional means of reducing error in this context, previ-
ously established means of improving unfamiliar face matching perfor-
mance such as adding multiple photos of the bearer to the ID card
(White, Burton, Jenkins, & Kemp, 2014) or selecting individuals on the
basis of their aptitude with faces (Bobak, Hancock, & Bate, 2016;
Davis, Lander, Evans, & Jansari, 2016; Robertson, Noyes, Dowsett,
Jenkins, & Burton, 2016) should be tested in a task which also
requires age verification to discern whether they further reduce the
age confirmation bias.
6 | CONCLUSIONS
In this study we investigated the potential for interactions between
age and identity verification processes. Across three experiments we
show that the confirmation that a “customer's” ID card has been
issued to an individual aged 18 or above results in a bias towards
accepting mismatching face pairs (i.e., two difference people) as a
match. Experienced cashiers showed fewer errors in this task, but per-
formance was still far from perfect, and a face-first checking strategy
was associated with improved performance to a greater extent than
pre-verified PASS cards. These results emphasize the importance of
understanding the details of unfamiliar face matching across a wide
range of daily tasks involving an ID-check.
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